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Abstract. It is a popular challenge to design authentication protocols
that are both privacy-friendly and scalable. A large body of literature
in RFID is dedicated to that goal, and many inventive mechanisms have
been suggested to achieve it. However, to the best of our knowledge,
none of these protocols have been tested so far in practical scenarios.
In this paper, we present an implementation of the OSK protocol, a
scalable and privacy-friendly authentication protocol, using a variant by
Avoine and Oechslin that accommodates it to time-memory trade-offs.
We show that the OSK protocol is suited to certain real-life scenarios, in
particular when the authentication is performed by low-resource mobile
devices. The implementation, done on an NFC-compliant cellphone and
a ZC7.5 contactless tag, demonstrates the practicability and efficiency of
the OSK protocol and illustrates that privacy-by-design is achievable in
constrained environments.
Keywords: RFID authentication, implementation, time-memory trade
offs, privacy
1 Introduction
A major research topic in RFID is the development of authentication
protocols that respect the privacy of the users, while still being efficient
enough to be applicable in large-scale systems. When the time needed
by the authentication process is not negligible, the user must hold the
card steady in front of the reader until reception of an audio or visual
signal. Long authentication processes are not practical in access control
systems where delaying the customer flow is not acceptable for example in
mass transportation or cultural events. It is generally agreed upon that
approximately 200 milliseconds can be dedicated to grant or deny the
access to a customer in a flow [10].
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Classical challenge-response protocols such as ISO/IEC 9798-2.2 [14]
can be privacy-friendly if the tag (prover) does not send its identifier in
the clear to the reader (verifier). In such a case, the reader must find
the tag identifier by performing an exhaustive search in its database.
For example, in a system managing 220 tags and a reader capable of
performing 220 cryptographic operations per second, the authentication
of a tag takes half a second on average, which is beyond the time threshold
that can be allocated to the security operations.
Several protocols have been designed to provide privacy in the authen-
tication. An additional property, named forward privacy, ensures that if
a tag is compromised at one point, an adversary is not able to trace it in
the past (given past communication traces). An example of such a pro-
tocol is the OSK protocol, proposed by Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita
in [20]. It may be regarded as one of the most privacy-friendly protocol
among the ones that allow for an efficient authentication procedure based
on symmetric-key cryptography [1].
An implementation of this protocol was previously done in [6]. It uses
rainbow tables accomodated for OSK, as proposed by Avoine and Oech-
slin in [5]. However, we show in this paper that in the setting of [6], a
faster and simpler approach is viable, namely the full storage. Instead,
we focus on systems with low-resource mobile readers, such as PDA’s or
NFC-compliant cellphones, and adapt this implementation to that con-
text. We show that such a protocol with very good privacy properties is
efficient enough to be used in practice, even in such constrained environ-
ments.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the OSK protocol
in Sect. 2 and the adapted time-memory trade-off in Sect. 3. The method
of Avoine and Oechslin for accommodating OSK for time-memory trade-
offs is described in Sect. 4. We describe our implementation and discuss
our results in Sect. 5. We finally conclude in Sect. 6.
2 Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita’s Protocol
2.1 Description
The OSK protocol is proposed by Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita in [20].
It is one of the most well-known RFID-devoted authentication protocols
and is the earliest one that achieves forward privacy4. In the RFID con-
text, forward privacy is the property that guarantees the security of past
4 It is also known as backward untraceability and used interchangeably in some pa-
pers [16, 18, 21].
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interactions of a tag even if it is compromised at a later stage. Namely,
the secret information of a tag Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is corrupted by an adversary
at time t, the adversary can not associate any transaction with Ti at any
time t′ < t.
In the OSK protocol, each tag Ti has an initial secret S0i that is up-
dated after each authentication query. The update consists in hashing
the current secret with the one-way function H. Upon reception of the
authentication query, the tag answers by hashing the current secret with
a different5 hash function, G. Fig. 1 shows the OSK protocol.
R Ti
request−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
find S0i s.t.
∃j ≥ 0 : G(Hj(S0i )) = σ
σ=G(Sji )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Sj+1i = H(Sji )
Fig. 1. OSK Protocol
System Setup. Each tag Ti of the system is initialized with a randomly
chosen secret S0i . The n initial secrets are stored in a database, sometimes
called back-end system. In some settings the back-end system and the
reader are two different devices, connected in a way that is considered
secure. In some other settings the back-end system is embedded in the
readers.
Interrogation. When the tag is queried by a reader it answers with a
response using the current secret such that σ = G(Sji ) and also updates
the secret immediately using a different hash function: Sj+1i = H(Sji ).
Search & Identification. When receiving an answer the database searches
for an initial secret S0i that leads to σ. In other words, it checks whether
there exists i and j such that G(Hj(S0i )) = σ. To do that, from each of
the n initial secrets S0i , the reader computes the hash chains as shown
in Fig. 2 until it finds a value matching σ, or until it reaches a given
maximum limit L (the “lifetime” of a tag) on the chain length.
5 Note that although these two functions need to be different, only one algorithm may
be implemented on the tag, and an additional 1-bit input parameter used to select
the function.
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S01 −→ r01 r11 r21 . . . rL−11 rL1
S02 −→ r02 r12 r22 . . . rL−12 rL2
. . . −→ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S0i −→ . . . . . . . . . rji = G(Hj(S0i )) . . . rLi
. . . −→ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S0n −→ r0n r1n r2n . . . rL−1n rLn
Fig. 2. OSK table: chains of hashes in the OSK protocol.
The value σ = G(Sji ) does not leak any information to an attacker
on the secret of Ti when G and H behave as pseudo-random functions.
However, given that the authentication process is bounded by L, the OSK
protocol is prone to desynchronization when an adversary queries the tag
more than L times. In such a case, the tag can no longer be authenti-
cated and a privacy issue arises for a certain type of adversary, capable
of detecting the success status of an authentication (see [15] for a discus-
sion). Fortunately, the synchronization can be retrieved by the back-end
without exchanging the tag; for example, the holder of a desynchronized
tag can ask the system operator to recompute the chain of his tag.
Beside this desynchronization issue – and although the protocol is
very efficient when all the tags are synchronized [20] – the worst-case
complexity of the search procedure makes the protocol unsuitable for
most practical applications.
2.2 Real-life Applications
We now discuss the possibility of implementing OSK in real-life applica-
tions. Throughout this article, we chose a system of n = 220 tags with a
lifetime of L = 27, which are reasonable parameters and in accordance
with [3].
Online Search. A na¨ıve approach for the server is to only keep the initial
secrets and recompute the n×L possibilities each time it receives a given
σ. With a server capable of 220 cryptographic hash operations per second,
this takes 26 seconds ≈ 1 minute on average for these parameters. This
is far beyond our limit of 200 milliseconds for a reasonable identification
time.
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Full Storage. The other extreme solution consists in storing all the
chains in a table and letting the server perform a simple look-up when-
ever it receives σ. This solution has the advantage of requiring no crypto-
graphic operation during the authentication, which makes the authenti-
cation very fast. Unfortunately, this approach has two major drawbacks.
First of all, a large memory is needed to store the table: given our
parameters (n = 220 tags with a lifetime of L = 27, and a hash size
of 128 bits), the full storage approach requires 234 bits = 2 GB.6 In a
system where readers are permanently connected to the back-end server,
requiring such a memory (RAM) for the server is not a major problem.
However, in systems consisting of mobile readers sporadically connected
to the database, the authentication material should be replicated in each
of these low-resource devices. In such a scenario, this amount of memory
is very large for small devices such as PDA’s or handheld RFID readers,
which typically have a memory of 128 MB. It might, however, be reason-
able for more elaborate devices such as NFC-enabled smartphones, which
have several gigabytes of flash memory.
A second issue is that, every now and then, the table needs to be
either computed in a central server and uploaded on the smartphones,
or computed by the smartphones themselves after reception of the first
column of the table. This might take a significant time for both cases,
and might be an issue in certain situations.
In the context of [6] for instance, where a central server is used, the
full storage technique makes sense, and is more simple and efficient.
Time-Memory Trade-Off. An intermediate solution is the time-memory
trade-off (TMTO). The idea is to use memory to reduce the authentica-
tion time, making both memory and time suitable to our application.
Note that the goal of the TMTO is here to reach an authentication time
that is below the acceptable threshold of 200 ms. Once this requirement
is fulfilled, still decreasing the time does not make sense because (i) this
implies a memory cost (ii) the authentication time would become a neg-
ligible factor in the whole communication time.
3 Background on Time-memory Trade-offs
In this section, we briefly recall the required background on the Time-
Memory Trade-off (TMTO) method. We describe the TMTO technique
6 If one wants to index the hashes with (i, j) couples, the memory increases by 25%
(32 bits appended to each of the 128-bit hashes).
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but make no attempt at providing a complete survey of it. For an ad-
vanced introduction about this topic we recommend to read [4].
3.1 Introduction
A common search problem in cryptanalysis is finding the preimage of a
given output of a one-way function. The first na¨ıve method is applying the
function to all possible inputs until finding the expected value. Such an
exhaustive search requires N operations in the worst case to find a preim-
age, where N is the total size of the problem. This becomes impractical
when N is large.
The other extreme is to first construct a look-up table including all
the preimage values. Afterwards, finding a preimage is done via a table
look-up operation which requires a negligible amount of time. The pre-
computation process requires an effort equal to an exhaustive search, but
is to be performed only once. Although this method is quite fast during
the online search phase, it may require extreme amounts of memory for
large problems.
The comparison of exhaustive search and exhaustive storage methods
is depicted in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of exhaustive search and table look-up methods (Average case).
Exhaustive search Exhaustive storage
Precomputation 0 N
Online computation N/2 0
Memory (storage) 0 N
3.2 Description
The basic idea of the time-memory trade-off (TMTO) method is to find
a compromise that has a lower online computation complexity than the
exhaustive key search, and a lower memory complexity than the exhaus-
tive storage. Hellman introduced one such trade-off in 1980 [13]. Given
a search space of size N , and given M words of memory used for the
trade-off, the average number of cryptographic operations T obeys the
law N2 ∝ T ×M2 [13]. The principle is the following. During an initial
phase, a point is chosen arbitrarily in the search space, hashed (or ci-
phered, depending on the target function), and then reduced to another
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point in the search space. This reduction is the output of a reduction
function, which is typically a modulo. This process is iterated a given
number of times, forming a chain of hashes. This whole operation is itself
repeated many times and only the starting points and endpoints of the
chains are kept and stored in a table. Once this table is computed, it is
used in the online phase to accelerate the search. The method is proba-
bilistic given that it is very unlikely to fully cover the search space, but
several tables can be used to obtain a success probability very close to 1.
A major improvement over Hellman’s original TMTO method [13]
was given by Oechslin in [8]. The precomputed table called rainbow table
for this method is structurally different than Hellman’s TMTO in that it
uses a different reduction function in each column. By doing so, although
it might seem to slow the search process, chain fusions (events in the
table construction and the search process that degrade the efficiency) in
the table are much less frequent and can be detected very easily during
their construction. Tables without fusion are said perfect [9] and will be
used in this paper.
We now give the most relevant results in the analysis of rainbow tables.
Theorem 1. The probability of success of a set of ` rainbow tables of m
rows of t columns each, for a problem of size N is:
P = 1−
(
1− mt
N
)`t
.
Proof. See [4].
Theorem 2. The maximum number of chains in a rainbow table of t
columns, for a problem of size N is:
mmaxt =
2N
t+ 1
.
Proof. See [4].
Theorem 3. The optimal parameters for a rainbow table, for a problem
of size N , given a memory of M and a desired probability of success P ∗
are:
` =
⌈− log(1− P ∗)
2
⌉
,
mt =
M
`
,
t =
log(1− P ∗)
` log
(
1− mtN
) ≈ −N
M
log(1− P ∗).
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Proof. See [4].
In the following, optimal parameters are implicitly used.
4 OSK/AO
4.1 Description
Avoine and Oechslin propose in [5] to apply the time-memory trade-
offs to the search procedure of OSK, leading so to a variant known as
OSK/AO. The complexity of the search procedure varies from O(1) to
O(N), depending on the amount of memory we are willing to devote to
the time-memory trade-off. For example, they mention that a complexity
of O(N2/3) can be reached with a memory of size O(N2/3).
Avoine, Dysli, and Oechslin also suggest in [3] a variant of the OSK
protocol that ensures strong authentication, as OSK is originally designed
to ensure identification only, without consequently considering replay at-
tacks. To do so, [3] suggests using nonces as follows: the reader sends
a nonce r in the authentication request message and the tag answers
G(Sji ⊕ r) along with G(Sji ). The latter value is used by the reader to
identify the tag, and the former to authenticate it.
Another advantage of OSK/AO is that the search done in the iden-
tification is intrinsically randomized, which makes timing attacks irrele-
vant [2].
Now we briefly describe the specific time-memory trade-off technique
introduced in [3, 5].
In this technique there are two main functions namely a response
generating function F and a reduction function R. F takes two indices as
an input (i.e., tag index and life time index) and outputs a tag response
such that
F : (i, j) 7→ G(Hj(S0i )) = rji
The reduction function R is such that
R : rji 7→ (i′, j′)
where 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ n, and 0 ≤ j, j′ ≤ L.
The main specificity is that F requires j+1 cryptographic operations
to be computed, which would drastically lower the efficiency of the search
if it were used directly. What is suggested instead is to use a second
kind of-time-memory trade-off, called the rapid-hash table, to compute
F efficiently. This trade-off table is rather straightforward: the secrets
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Sji of the tags are computed from life-time values 0 to L, but only
L
κ
columns are stored. This is illustrated in Fig. 3. As explained in Sect. 4.3,
this means that an average of κ+12 cryptographic operations are required
per evaluation of F .
S01 S
κ
0 S
2κ
0 . . . S
(bL
κ
c−2)κ
0 S
(bL
κ
c−1)κ
0
S02 S
κ
1 S
2κ
1 . . . S
(bL
κ
c−2)κ
1 S
(bL
κ
c−1)κ
1
...
...
S0i S
κ
i S
2κ
i . . . S
(bL
κ
c−2)κ
i S
(bL
κ
c−1)κ
i
...
...
S0n S
κ
n−1 S
2κ
n−1 . . . S
(bL
κ
c−2)κ
n−1 S
(bL
κ
c−1)κ
n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
κ
columns
Fig. 3. The rapid-hash table.
4.2 Analysis
As explained in Sect. 4.1, there are two things that need to be stored in
memory: the rainbow tables and the rapid-hash table. We discuss belowd
the proportion of memory that should be dedicated to each.
Let ρ denote the proportion of memory dedicated to the rainbow
tables. The trade-off efficiency follows the rule T = N2γ/M2RT (see [4,
13]), with γ being a small factor depending on the probability of success
of the trade-off, and MRT the memory dedicated to the rainbow tables
(that is ρM). As for the rapid-hash table, we have:
κ =
⌈
N |hash|
MRH
⌉
,
with |hash| the size of a hash, and MRH the memory for the rapid-hash
table (that is (1−ρ)M). Each operation in the rainbow tables requires an
average of κ+12 cryptographic operations in the rapid-hash table. There-
fore:
T =
N2γ
M2RT
κ+ 1
2
≈ N
2γ
ρ2M2
N |hash|
2(1− ρ)M .
The optimal value of ρ can be found easily by deriving:
∂T
∂ρ
= 0 ⇔ ∂
∂ρ
[
1
ρ2(1− ρ)
]
=
3ρ− 2
(ρ− 1)2ρ3 = 0,
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which yields ρopt =
2
3 . In the following, we will thus take the memory for
the rainbow tables to be two thirds of the total memory7.
4.3 Algorithms
We now describe the algorithms used in OSK/AO, namely (i) the algo-
rithm to compute the rapid-hash table (Algorithm 1), (ii) the algorithm
to build the TMTO tables (Algorithm 2), and (iii) the algorithm to iden-
tify the tag (Algorithm 3). The material in this section mostly comes
from [6]. The notations used in the algorithms are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Notations used throughout the paper.
n Number of tags in the system.
L Life time of a tag in the system (in terms of authentication executions).
` Number of TMTO tables.
t Length of the chains of a rainbow table.
Sji Secret of the i-th tag used for the j + 1-th authentication where 1 ≤
i ≤ n, and 0 ≤ j ≤ L.
H, G Collision resistant one-way functions.
rapidH(i, j) Function which computes the j-th secret of the i-th tag such that
Sji = Hj(S0i ). This function uses a precomputed rapid hash (RH) table
to compute hashes faster. The construction of this function is demon-
strated in Algorithm 1.
κ Length of the interval between hash indices. This parameter is needed
for computing rapid hashes.
state[i][k] A pre-computed two-dimensional array which stores the k × κ-th hash
value of the i-th tag’s initial secret (Hk×κ(S0i )). For instance, let κ = 6,
i = 1 and k = 6, then state[1][6] stores S361 = H36(S01). This array is
used during the evaluation of rapidH(i, j).
F(i, j) The response generating function inputs two parameters, the tag index
and the life time of the tag. This function uses the rapid-hash function.
It outputs a tag response such that F(i, j) = G(rapidH(i, j)).
Tablev The v-th TMTO table which stores the starting and endpoints (indices)
of the TMTO table, where 1 ≤ v ≤ `.
Rvw(val) For w-th column of the v-th table, a simple reduction function which
maps input val into a output with smaller size, where 1 ≤ w ≤ t.
First, the system randomly generates the initial secrets for all the
tags such that S0i ∈R {0, 1}λ where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and λ is the length of
7 Note that this result is compliant with the analysis done in [5]. The development
done in this section is somewhat simpler and matches the notations used in the rest
of this paper.
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the secrets. The system defines a κ parameter then computes the interval
secret values of all the tags. After that all the secrets are stored into a two
dimensional array such that state[i][k] := Hk×κ(S0i ) where k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
and 0 ≤ k × κ ≤ L.
Now, for a given secret of tag i, the j-th rapid-hash computation of the
secret is presented in Algorithm 1. The algorithm requires only at most κ
hashes by the help of the precomputed RH table. Whenever κ decreases,
the memory usage increases but the on-line computation decreases.
Algorithm 1 Compute y = rapidH(i, j)
Require: 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ L
Ensure: y = Sji
y ← state[i][⌊ j
κ
⌋
]
a← j mod κ
while a 6= 0 do
y = H(y)
a← a− 1
end while
return y
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure to construct a single rainbow TMTO
table. For the construction, only two parameters are needed: the number
of starting points used in the precomputation phase (generally named
m1 [4]) and the number of the table to be generated. The starting points
of a TMTO table are fed into the F function sequentially. The output is
actually a response of a tag in the system and is fed into the reduction
function which outputs arbitrary indices. For a single chain this process is
repeated consecutively up to a pre-defined chain size t, then the starting
and endpoints are stored in the table. Finally, each generated ending point
is compared in the table to detect fusions. When two chains generate a
fusion, one of them is discarded. This procedure eventually leads to a
perfect table.
Finally, Algorithm 3 shows the identification process of a tag by ex-
tracting the pre-image of a given response using TMTO tables. This part
of the system runs during the authentication of a tag. First, TagResp
(the answer of the tag) is fed into the reduction function Rvt and searched
among the ending points of the TMTO table. (i) If a match is found,
the corresponding starting point is iterated as explained in Algorithm 2
up to the (t− 1)th reduction function Rvt in order to get a candidate re-
sponse. If the candidate response is equal to TagResp then identification
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Algorithm 2 Construction of Tablev (j, m1, v)
Require: 1 ≤ j, 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n× j , v ≥ 1
table← {∅}
for i = 1 to
⌈
m1
j
⌉
do
for k = 0 to j do
nextResp← F(i, k)
for w = 1 to t− 1 do
z[ ]←Rvw(nextResp)
nextResp = F(z[0], z[1])
end for
z[ ]←Rvt (nextResp)
if z 6∈ table then
add the record {(i, k); (z[0], z[1])} into table
end if
if (i− 1)× j + k ≥ m1 then
break
end if
end for
end for
clean table
return table
is completed. Otherwise (ii) TagResp fed into the reduction function such
that Rvt−1(TagResp), then the resulting indices fed into F , and then the
resulting response fed into Rvt (TagRespnext) consecutively. As previously
done, the output value search among the endpoints of the TMTO table
and the similar process is carried as described above.
5 Experiments and Comparison
5.1 Environment
The precomputations are performed with a personal computer having
Intel 2.8GHz Core2 Duo processor, 4GB RAM and Windows 7 - 64-bit
operating system. As an NFC enabled mobile phone we use LG OPTI-
MUS 4X HD having 1.5GHz processor and 1GB RAM [17]. The cell phone
has an open source Linux-based operating system, Android. This OS has
a large community of contributors who develop applications primarily
written in a customized version of the Java programming language [22].
The phone supports both ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15693 standards
which are the common standards in order to read/write 13.56 MHz con-
tactless smart cards.
For the tags, we work on professional version of ZeitControlers basic
card ZC7.5 (ZC − Basic) which is a programmable processor card as
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Algorithm 3 Identify (Tablev, TagResp)
Require: TagResp ∈ {0, 1}λ, v ≥ 1
Ensure: TagResp ← G(y)
for q = t down to 1 do
nextResp←TagResp
for i = q to t− 1 do
z[ ]←Rvi (nextResp)
nextResp← F(z[0], z[1])
end for
z[ ]←Rvt (nextResp)
if z ∈ Tablev then
{z′; z} ← Tablev(z)
nextResp← F(z′[0], z′[1])
for w = 1 to q − 1 do
z˜[ ]←Rvw(nextResp)
nextResp← F(z˜[0], z˜[1])
end for
if nextResp = TagResp then
return true
end if
end if
end for
return false
hardware environment for protocol implementation [12]. It has a micro-
controller with 32kB user EEPROM that holds its own operating system
(OS) and it has 2.9kB RAM for user tag’s data. It supports ISO/IEC
14443. The EEPROM contains the user’s Basic code, compiled into a
virtual machine language known as P-Code (the Java programming lan-
guage uses the same technology). The RAM contains run-time data and
the P-Code stack. The overview of the system is depicted in Figure 4.
5.2 Parameters and Functions
The parameters for the experiments are n = 220, L = 27 and the one-way
functions we selected are the following ones8:
– H(Sji ) : AESK(Sji )⊕ Sji = Sj+1i ,
– G(Sji ) : AESK(Sji + 1)⊕ (Sji + 1) = rji
where K is a 128-bit constant key. This is known as the Matyas-
Meyer-Oseas construction [19]. Its goal is to build a one-way function
from a block cipher.
8 The parameters are the same than the ones in [3].
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LG Optimus 4X P880
Android 4.1
NFC enabled phone
Processor: 1.5 GHz 
RAM: 1.0 GB
Basic card ZC 7.5
EEPROM: 32 kB
RAM: 2.9 kB
Tag
Processor: 2.8 GHz
RAM: 4 GB
Windows 7 – 64 bit
Programming Lang: Java
Fig. 4. Overview of the system
We use the AES algorithm in the construction because it is commonly
implemented on fewer gates than classical hash functions (see e.g. [11]),
and, in particular, is also available in the ZC7.5. This construction re-
quires only one key schedule during the initialization phase of the tags,
which makes algorithm faster.
To construct rainbow tables each column of each table uses a different
reduction function. The function takes three parameters that are the table
index (v ∈ [0, 1, . . . , ` − 1]), the column index (w ∈ [1, 2, . . . , t]) and
the response output as a byte array (val[.]). This function produces two
output values; the first one is for tag index (i = 0, . . . , n− 1), the second
one is for lifetime index(j = 0, . . . , L − 1). The i value is computed as
i = (Int32(val[v, v+ 3]) +w) mod n where the function Int32 converts
a given input 4-byte array into an unsigned 32-bit integer. The j value is
computed as i = (Int32(val[v+1, v+4])+w) mod L. The construction
of our reduction functions are given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Compute Rvw(val[.])
Require: v ≥ 0, w ≥ 1
Ensure: i ∈ Zn, j ∈ ZL
i← Int32(val[v, v + 3]) + w
j ← Int32(val[v + 1, v + 4]) + w
i = i mod n
j = j mod L
return {i, j}
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5.3 Precomputation of the Tables
In order to use our implementation on low-resource devices (such as hand-
held readers, PDAs and NFC compliant cellphones) we build tables that
can fit to small RAMs.
For the total memory there are two parts: (i) the rapid hash table
that stores some intermediate values of the OSK table and (ii) the TMTO
tables9. We use the optimal parameters, so we compute the κ and t such
that the memory consumption is as described in 4.2.
Another significant choice for the TMTO construction is the proba-
bility of success. It should be high enough to avoid false negatives during
the authentication process. In our scenario, using ` = 4 rainbow tables
of maximal size, the probability to identify a tag is greater than 0.999
according to Theorem 1. Note that trying to reach a higher success prob-
ability does not make sense given that the probability of failure due to
noise on the channel is even higher.
Finally, regarding the number of starting points m1, we use the same
trick as in [4] to reduce the precomputation effort. In our case, we obtain
about 98% of the maximal number of ending points by starting with 50
times that number.
In total, the precomputation cost is `×m1× t evaluations of F , which
is about 4×50×mt× t = 400nL in our case (see Theorem 2). Since these
are F evaluations, this number is also multiplied by κ+12 hash operations.
For instance, if κ = 6 and on a server capable of 220 hash operations
per second, the precomputation stage would take about 50 hours. Some
details about the precomputation of rainbow tables seem to have been
overlooked in [3, 5], which would explain their optimistic result. However,
we can do much better than that if we build a table containing the nL
secrets, and use it during the precomputation instead of the rapidH table.
This table needs nL|hash| bits, that is 2GB in our case, and takes about
2 minutes to build on the server. In this case, there are actually no hash
operations during the building of the TMTO table, making this procedure
faster. In our case the whole precomputation process takes about an hour.
5.4 Experiments
We tested the performance in two settings by running Algorithm 3 (i.e.,
identification process of OSK/AO with randomly chosen tags). Our mo-
bile phone [17] is able to compute about 187, 750 hashes per second. For
9 We used the prefix-suffix decomposition method, as described for instance in [7] in
order to reduce to some extent the size of the TMTO tables.
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both settings, the experiment is run 1, 000, 000 times. The experimental
results are depicted in Table 3.
Table 3. Results of experiments on an NFC compliant cellphone
Memory 253MB 113MB
Identification time 15.26ms 117.54ms
Length of the chains of the TMTO (t) 27 72
Number of chains of the TMTO (mt) 8968214 3566605
Rapid-hash parameter(κ) 22 43
Authentication rate 99.9% 99.9%
We also measure the time when we use our system with a real tag.
There are three phases on the tag’s side: receiving a query, computing
the response (two hash calculations), and sending the response. The total
time is 70 ms on average, including 50 ms for the calculation of the two
hash values and 20 ms for the communication.
It can be seen that the average identification time is below the 200
ms threshold (if we include the 70 ms for the tag computation and the
communication) even for a memory below 128MB. We thus show that
one can achieve very fast authentication even with limited memory.
6 Conclusion
We have implemented the OSK/AO [3] protocol on an NFC-compliant
cellphone and a ZC7.5 contactless tag. Our implementation is fully oper-
ational and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first implementation of
a privacy-friendly authentication protocol based on symmetric-key cryp-
tography. The implementation is suited to large-scale applications, e.g. a
million of tags, as this can be the case in mass transportation systems,
even on low-resource mobile devices such as hand held readers, PDAs
or NFC compliant cellphones. We have run several experiments on the
implemented RFID system and we show that the results obtained match
the theory and are favorable to a practical deployment.
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